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1. Introduction 
“Because they remain uncategorized by any formal measure, the exact 
number of PMFs that have entered the market is difficult to establish and it 
most definitely remains in constant flux.  The global number is estimated to be 
in the mid-hundreds.”  (Singer, 2003, p. 79). 
The purpose of this research is to help the US Department of Defense and 
other government security communities better understand the evolving PM (private 
military) sector (Avant, 2005; Jager & Kummel, 2007; Singer, 2003).  We anticipate 
our readers will be government agents, members of the international community, 
and others who wish to make informed decisions regarding the use of PMFs (private 
military firms). This report discusses one of the first steps in establishing a long-term 
program of research on the PM sector at NPS.  It is expected that knowledge about 
the sector will be built incrementally through a series of individual studies; no one 
study will provide a complete picture of the relevant features of the sector.  However, 
we believe a good starting point in this endeavor is to develop quantitative data 
about the industry, which this report attempts to do.  We suggest three reasons why 
this is an appropriate place to begin.   
First, while there are several conceptual and qualitative publications on the 
sector, there are very few quantitative studies.  Therefore, there is an important gap 
in our knowledge that we propose to fill with rigorous quantitative data. 
Second, without even rudimentary quantitative data, we have no way of 
knowing whether the firms that have been studied as individual cases (such as 
MPRI and Executive Outcomes) or those firms that have been given significant 
media attention (such as Blackwater and Halliburton) are typical industry participants 
or outliers.  Thus, our starting point is to ensure that we have a reasonably accurate 
picture of the sector by compiling quantitative data on it.  We need rudimentary data 
about the industry’s size in aggregate (i.e., the demography of firms—cf. Singer’s 
quote above), which major public corporations (such as the prime US defense 
contractors) are active in the sector and in what capacity, and the major capabilities 
of firms.  Much of the data presented in this report fulfills these needs: it is basic, but 
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since our collective understanding of the sector is also fairly basic, this information 
may well be of some utility to readers of this report.  As well as giving us a sense of 
what we think we already know, the data also provides a platform on which further 
studies can be built; i.e., it provides a context in which future research can be set.  
To proceed to these more advanced topics, we must first pass through the entry 
gate; that is, we must ensure that the basic building blocks for comprehension and 
analysis are in place. We think that at least some of the data we exhibit is new and 
has—as far as we know—never been presented before. 
Third—and perhaps most importantly—while most of our data lends support 
to already published literature, the process of studying a large data set and 
attempting to analyze it has brought to light certain discrepancies, inconsistencies 
and anomalies between the way the sector is sometimes described and the reality of 
the empirical data.  This has led us to attempt our own re-description of the sector in 
a way that we believe is more congenial to the data we have collected.  Two 
impressions stand out.  First, the private military sector is by no means a unitary 
industry: it actually is an amalgam of several different elements that have 
independent drivers and are developing along different trajectories.  In our analysis, 
the evolution of the supply-side of the industry is, therefore, rather complex and 
dynamic.  Second, we believe that industry has a richer and more diverse set of 
demand drivers than is generally acknowledged.  In our analysis, the demand 
factors driving the long-term evolution of the industry involve the private sector, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), non-military government departments, and 
international organizations.  Short-term demand factors are more military-related and 
involve co-opting a sector that has, in large part, traditionally served other 
customers.  
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2. Methodology Used and Background to This 
Study 
A. Methodology 
The data used in this report was collected primarily by three NPS MBA 
students (Jared Mitchell, Don Robbins and Chuck Dunar) working on their thesis 
project in the fall of 2007 under the supervision of Nick Dew and Bryan Hudgens.  
The combined faculty and student input into the data collection effort approximates 
one man-year of work.   
Data collection proceeded through three phases.  We started by assembling a 
list of firms known to be active, or to have been active at one time, in the PM sector.  
We screened various publications about the industry for an initial list of PMFs (for 
example, Avant, 2005; Singer, 2003).  Based on this initial list of names, we 
assembled further names of firms using a snowball method (Goodman, 1961); i.e., 
our searches for information on the initial names invariably turned up new firms, 
which we then added to the list.  We kept working on the snowball until we 
exhausted the search for new names; in other words, further searches did not reveal 
any new firms.  Almost all of this searching was conducted online, using various 
databases available through the NPS library and public resources available via 
online search engines.  Using this methodology, we assembled a list of 550 firms 
“named” by one source or another as having been active in the sector. 
Second, we found that many firms in the sector have a website which offers 
information about the organization.  Using these and other resources, we assembled 
more detailed data on the firms in our sample—such as their founding date, founder 
background information, the firms’ countries of origin, and data on the capabilities 
these firms purport to have. 
Third, one of us gathered follow-up and fill-in data on specific firms in order to 
write this report. 
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Further elements leading to the assembly of this report included coding data 
in our database, analyzing the raw and coded data, and presenting it in easily 
understood formats.  Coding (for instance) of capabilities was conducted by two of 
us (one student, one author).  This process was particularly lengthy and laborious 
since it involved over 2,500 lines of data on capabilities, many redundant 
descriptions of capabilities, and much recoding work in order to get the data into a 
“clean” format.  Individual fields were coded independently, and critical variables 
(such as codings of Singer’s “Tip of the Spear” schema and Avant’s categorization 
scheme for contract types) were coded by both coders.  Though we have not yet 
measured inter-rater reliability of these codings, we estimate that more than 80% of 
codings are identical. 
The analysis process involved several iterations in order to produce the final 
charts, graphs and data presented in this report. The final portion of the research 
process involved both finding ways to display the data in formats that are easy for 
the reader to understand and writing this report. 
The limitations of this study are worth particular attention.  For most data 
categories, the data on PMFs is incomplete. For instance, we managed to find data 
on the founding dates of approximately 230 firms (approximately 40% of our 
sample).  We obtained data (at least in some rudimentary form) on capabilities for 
approximately 70% of firms, but the quality of this data (measured in terms of its 
comprehensiveness and trustworthiness) varies considerably.  The bottom line of 
our data-collection effort is that we can only analyze the data available, doing our 
best to verify its reasonableness as we go.  We cannot attest for the accuracy of 
some aspects of this data—for example, that the capabilities firms purport to have 
are “true.”  Of course, the accuracy of self-reported data is a problem for researchers 
generally, and not for our study alone.  
However, we do not know of any database on the industry that is more 
comprehensive than the one we have assembled.  As far as we know, the sample 
size we have used is much larger than any other so far studied in the sector; this 
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should make our results more robust because of the (generally) favorable statistical 
properties of large samples.   
3. Organizational Demographics of the PM Sector 
A. Founding Dates, Population and Industry Growth 
For this study, we traced data on 550 firms that appear to have been active in 
the PM sector.  Of these, we were able to find data on the founding dates of 
approximately 230 firms.  As shown in Figure 1, based on this sample of 230 firms, 






















































































Figure 1. Pattern of PMF Founding by Year, 1970-2006 
Further examination of the data indicates that half the firms for which we 
managed to find founding dates were founded between 1995 and 2007; the other 
half were founded before 1995.  This makes the PM sector a relatively young 
industry: half the industry is less than 13 years old; the median age of firms is quite 
low.  This fact is an interesting contrast to the history of mercenary companies, 
which, of course, has very deep roots—stretching back at least until the Early 
Modern period (15th and 16th Centuries) (Oritz, 2007a).   





















































Figure 2. PMF Founding Pattern by Region 
Figure 2 suggests that the recent wave of new PMFs is predominantly a US 
effect.  Note in particular the trend lines for firm foundings: the US trend line is rather 
steep, whereas the UK and ROW (rest of world) trend lines are almost flat.  What 
this trend suggests is that PMF growth is being driven by US effects—such as 
outsourcing strategy in the late 1990s and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
One possible way of classifying entry into the PM sector is to categorize it as 
occurring in different “eras.” as follows: 
 Cold War period (1945-1989) 
 A quiet period in the industry’s history.  
 Post-Cold War period (1990-2001) 
 Prevalence of supply-side factors: military drawdown. 
 Demand-side factors include civil wars in Africa and the 
emergence of outsourcing as a major strategy in the US DoD 
(Department of Defense). 
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 Post-9/11 period (2002-present day) 
 Prevalence of demand-side factors—surge capacity to support 
OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and the WoT (War on Terror). 
Table 1 indicates data on the average number of firms founded in these eras.    
Table 1. Summary of PMF Foundings in Three Different “Eras” 
 SUM YEARS AVG 
PRE-1990 99 45 4 
1990-2001 120 12 10 
2002-2006 48 5 10 
 
If we examine this data graphically, we observe a different picture of the 
trends in PMF founding (note the trend lines are generally quite flat in Figure 3).  
Now we can see that the surge in PMFs is a consistent feature of the post-Cold War 
era that is driven by new US firms entering the sector.  This means that the sector 
growth is not a post-9/11 phenomenon (as is commonly thought), but a post-Cold 
War phenomenon. 




















Figure 3. PMF Foundings, 1990-2006 
B. Geographic Distribution of PMFs 
We found it comparatively simple to retrieve data on the nationality of PMFs.  
We found data for over 500 firms (90%) of our population.  Note that our data is very 
consistent with the IPOA’s (International Peace Operations Association) surveys 
(2006 and 2007) that were based on much smaller samples. 















Figure 4. Geographical Distribution of PMFs 
As is evidenced in Figure 4, the industry is a 50% US and 20% UK 
phenomenon.  However, this was probably not always so.  The tremendous growth 
in the number of US firms entering the industry in the past 10 years (see Figure 2) 
has probably changed the international composition of the industry.  Prior to the 
burst of US entry, the industry was probably more cosmopolitan in its composition. 
Several factors might explain this international distribution.  One factor might 
be outsourcing and privatization, which may make PMFs more prevalent in the US 
and UK.  Another factor may be demand factors—i.e., the need for surge capacity 
for the US and UK to meet their commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and to the WoT 
(War on Terror).  A further factor may come from the supply-side—i.e., a distinct 
geographical pattern governing the distribution of skills required for establishing 
PMFs.  This requires the combination of specialist military/security skills and 
generalist entrepreneurial skills. These may be more prevalent in the US and UK.  
Lastly, we have not yet tested this distribution for correlation with more general 
factors, such as defense spending in these particular geographies (PMFs per $ 
billion defense spend), population (PMFs per million), or economic scale (PMFs per 
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$ billion GDP).  Future research might endeavor to explore these and other possible 
relationships. 












Figure 5. PMF Founder Backgrounds  
(based on data on 116 firms) 
Figure 5 presents the data we managed to collect on founder characteristics 
for 116 PMFs (approximately 20% of our sample).  What this reveals is initially 
unsurprising: most PMFs are founded by individual entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial 
teams that have prior military experience.  However, the proportion of firms founded 
by individuals with special operations experience is a surprise—almost 40% of firms 
were founded by individuals with this background.   
One possible explanation for this result is that our sample is skewed: perhaps 
firms founded by individuals with special operations experience are more likely to 
“tout” their qualifications.  Other possibilities include both demand-side and supply-
side factors.  On the demand-side, perhaps special operations skill sets are in 
particularly high demand in the PM sector, or perhaps these activities are seen as 
particularly good or easy targets for contracting-out.   
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On the supply side, one again wonders about the combination of skills 
required for running a successful PMF: perhaps individuals with entrepreneurial 
tendencies are more likely to select into special operations domains, or perhaps 
special operations experience tends to nurture particular organizational skills and 
self-confidence that lead individuals to participate in an entrepreneurial endeavor.   
Based on our initial analysis, founder characteristics would make a good topic 
for future research on the PM sector. 








Named subsidiaries of Public firms
 
Figure 6. Public-private: PMF Status 
Data we gathered indicates that well over 90% of the firms in the PM sector 
are privately held (see Figure 6).  Only a few firms (25) active in the sector are 
publicly held. This number is based on a generous definition of the industry and, 
therefore, includes the major defense contractors (the “primes”) and many firms that 
mainly supply IS/IT-related products and services to the DoD and other security 
agencies worldwide.  The number of “pure play” public PMFs is, in fact, very low: 
only two firms in our sample meet this definition (DynCorp and ArmourGroup).  In 
Chapter 5 of this report, we will analyze public firms in the sector in more detail.  
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One important issue inherent in this analysis is the lack of transparency in the 
industry; this flaw is frequently highlighted by critics.  PM sector firms are perceived 
to be rather secretive (Avant, 2005).  Our data points to the fact that there are two 
elements involved in this secrecy:  
 First, private firms generally lack transparency to outsiders, regardless 
of their industry.  Some of this is a systematic side- effect of being 
private, not the result of deliberate policy. After all, they are not 
required to be transparent, and they have no reason to be.  If most 
PMFs are private, then one would expect the industry to lack 
transparency, regardless of its activity type.  
 Second, PMFs have other legitimacy-related concerns and sometimes 
security-related reasons for shying away from the public eye.  Thus, 
their privacy, opaqueness, ambiguity and general lack of transparency 
may be a deliberate strategy.  This element is over-and-above what is 
common to all private firms.  
A second issue brought to light by our data is that it seems rather unlikely that 
the PM sector will ever emerge as a significant aspect of the so-called military-
industrial-complex.  The sector’s organization is quite dissimilar from that of 
equipment manufacturers; unlike the manufacturing sector, the PM sector simply 
does not have the economies of scale that have driven a concentration of large 
players (the “primes”).  Instead, the industry is highly dispersed—i.e., populated by 
firms that are generally quite small compared to those in the defense-equipment 
sector. 
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4. Capabilities/Activities Analysis 
Our database contains 2,500 lines of data on the capabilities/activities of 395 
PMFs. The comprehensiveness of this data varies by firm; but as a starting point, we 
believe it is a useful approximation of what firms in the sector do.  To help analyze 
the data, we began with the categorizations provided in the literature on the PM 
sector, i.e., Singer (2003) and Avant (2005).  
A. A Starting Point: Singer’s Categorization of PMFs 
One popular device that emerged from Singer’s (2003) book on the PM sector 
is the ”tip of the spear” analysis.  Singer used this tool to help analyze the industry 
and then used case studies of particular firms in different places on the spear to 
illustrate the analysis in more depth.  For instance, he posed EO (Executive 
Outcomes) as the quintessential “Military Provider Firm,” MPRI as an example in the 
“Military Consultant Firm” category, and KBR as an example of a “Military Support 
Firm.”  See the Figure 7 for a reproduction of Singer’s diagram: 





Figure 7. Singer’s “Tip of the Spear”  
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B. Avant’s Refinements to Singer’s Categorization Scheme: 
Form Firms to Contracts 
Deborah Avant (2005) proposed a slightly different approach to the analysis 
Singer provided.  She found that it was difficult to classify individual firms using 
Singer’s typology because many firms are diversified, offering a variety of services 
that appear in different places on the spear; e.g., Blackwater provides close 
protection, offers firearms training, has a parachuting training team and produces an 
armored vehicle, among its activities).  Moreover, Avant found that firms move 
around the spear, offering different services to different buyers at different points in 
time.  For these reasons, Avant proposed that contracts are a better tool for 
analyzing the sector.  She categorized contracts according to five types, as follows: 
 Operational support 
 Site/Personal Security 
 Military Advice and Training 
 Crime Prevention/Intelligence 
 Logistical Support 
Avant then showed how these contract types incorporate into the “tip of the 





 - 16 - 
 
Figure 8. Avant’s Analysis of the Spear 
(Avant, 2005, p. 17) 
 
C. A Further Revised “Tip of the Spear” Analysis: From 
Firms, to Contracts, to Capabilities 
Singer’s analysis focused on firms; Avant’s analysis focused on contracts.  In 
what follows, we offer an extension of these analyses that focuses on capabilities.  


























 - 17 - 
move around the spear, but that they will continue to be/do both. In other words, an 
analysis of what tasks firms have been performing over time does not capture firms’ 
potential movement around the spear.  There is an even broader scope of latent 
activity.  One way to investigate this latent potential is to collect data on the 
capabilities firms claim they have.  The following section focuses on these capability 
sets. 
Capabilities are important because underlying contracts (transactions in the 
marketplace) are firm-level capabilities.  The concept of capabilities is widely used 
for analysis in the strategic management literature because it focuses on the building 
blocks for activities that are present in a firm (and, therefore, an industry sector).  
Firms distinguish themselves by their capabilities—firms are able to get contracts 
others cannot access because they can either do things other firms cannot do, or 
they can do them at a lower cost than their competitors.  Therefore, in strategic 
management, capabilities are often thought of as crucial underlying variables that 
explain the relative performance of firms (Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997). 
Based on our attempts to cluster the approximately 2,500 individual 
capabilities in our data set, a rather different image of the “tip of the spear” emerged.  
By our analysis, the spear is much more heterogeneous than either Singer or 
Avant’s analysis suggests.  The key result of our analysis of individual capabilities is 
that the PM sector is by no means unitary.  In fact, it is made up of quite different 
sub-sectors, which are probably better thought of as a patchwork quilt than as 
elements up and down the spear.  This is particularly true for the category “Military 
support firms,” which contains a smorgasbord of sub-sectors.  These sub-sectors 
are essentially unrelated to one another in terms of the underlying capabilities 
required to support contracts in any particular area.  This means that the firms 
competing for contracts in these sub-sectors tend to come from very different 
industries (for instance, some services are ”add-ons” provided by major defense 
contractors; meanwhile, other services are provided by firms with capabilities that 
are largely undifferentiated from civilian/commercial skill sets,  such as logistics or 
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many IS/IT security activities).  This finding led us to present a revised “tip of the 
spear” diagram, displayed in Figure 9 below (in the figure, the individual elements 
are not sized or ordered to represent the data, but merely to convey an overall 

























































Figure 9. Revised “Tip of the Spear” 
 
D. Capability Analysis 
As illustrated in Figure 10, our data suggests that approximately half of the 
firms in our sample of 395 are engaged in some kind of protective and security 
services; 75% do advisory and training work, and almost 90% are engaged in some 
kind of support services (variously defined).  This data points clearly to the 
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intermingling of service provisions up and down the spear that Avant and Singer 


















Figure 10. PMF Activity Summary  






For the exact percentages, see Table 2 below: 
Table 2. Proportions of PMFs Active in PM Sub-sectors 
 % of Firms Active (Sample 395) 
Protection Services 53% 
Advisory/Training 76% 
Support Services 86% 
 
As found in Figure 11, another way to display this data is as proportions of the 


















Figure 11. Number of PMFs Active in Different Sub-sectors 
Viewed this way, about 25% of the different activities occurring in the sector 
can be classed as protective services, 35% as training and advisory, and 40% 
(almost half) as support services of various kinds. 
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Overall, we think this data will alarm some observers and satisfy others.  
Some people will be alarmed to find out that there are around 200 firms offering 
military competencies of various kinds for sale in the marketplace.  From this 
perspective, it is rather worrisome that there is an industry that specializes in fielding 
various kinds of (private) mini-armies to the highest bidder.  Others will find this fact 
reassuring rather than worrisome—for them, a significant number of firms means 
competition, which means efficiency.   
E. Protective and Security Services 
We conducted further analysis of the content of each PM sub-sector.  Results 














Figure 12. PMFs Engaged in Protective Services  
(209 total) 
This data indicates that about 2/3 of the firms active in the provision of 
protective services are involved in close protection of individuals and assets, i.e., 
stationary guarding and convoy protection.  When an individual thinks of private 
military and security contractors, this is probably what comes to mind.  Our data 
indicates that this role, indeed, is the mainstay of the protective services business.  
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However, there are other protective services activities.  About 30 firms are 
known to be active or capable of providing protective services for marine assets.  A 
similar number of firms have capabilities for conducting a variety of operations.  The 
kinds of services listed in the database include assault capabilities, rapid reaction 
forces, and special operations units.  A variety of miscellaneous services were also 
mentioned, as well as the provision of dog teams by a handful of firms. 
F. Training and Advisory Services 
Most firms that offer advisory (consulting) services also offer training services; 











training and consulting consulting only training only
 
Figure 13. PMFs Engaged in Training and Advisory Activities  
(240 firms) 
There is a wide range of advisory/consulting services.  Among these are 
risk/threat analysis, counter terrorism and current tactics.  However, we found that a 
very diverse range of advisory capabilities are offered in the marketplace.  This 
suggests that—globally, at least—this sector is quite well-developed and 
comprehensive in its offerings.  
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The same is true for training; our data indicates a very diverse range of 
training services are offered by firms—options too numerous to list.  According to our 
data, approximately 200 firms are active in the training market to some degree or 
another.  
G. Support Services 
Based on our earlier analysis (the results of which are displayed in Figure 9), 
it was apparent that diversity is also a hallmark of the support services offered in the 
PM sector.  However, some services are more widely available than others, as 






































































Figure 14. PMFs Offering Support Services  
(data from 335 firms) 
Two pieces of data seemingly jump out of Figure 14.  First, consistent with 
Avant’s analysis of contracts, intelligence support services are widely available in the 
sector.  This category includes a range of services such as surveillance, intelligence 
analysis, various counter measures, and information gathering.  The number of firms 
active in this service area indicates that significant competition exists. The second 
most available service is IS/IT/Communications.  Again, the provision of these 
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services appears to be highly competitive, with many firms offering a diverse range 
of activities in the marketplace. 
H. Geographic Distribution of Capabilities: Do Different 
Geographies Have Different Capability Sets? 
Are some geographies “tippier” than others?  Do some regions have a 


















Figure 15. Regional Capabilities Distribution  
(% of firms offering services in sub-sectors) 
When examining this data, we must remember first that the chart shows 
percentages, not absolute numbers of each geographic region’s firms active in each 
capability.  This is important because approximately half the industry is based in the 
US, and this fact would otherwise distort the data. 
The pattern that emerges in Figure 15 is that US firms are slightly more likely 
to be involved in support services and slightly less likely to be involved in protection 
services. However, overall, there is little difference between regions when the 
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service mix is analyzed at this level.  Of course, the service mix might show a 
geographic bias in narrower capability segments.  We have not yet studied this data. 
Two observations might be worth noting when we investigate the data on 
capabilities this way.  First, by moving to this lower unit of analysis (i.e., a lower unit 
of analysis than whole firms), we are able to examine clusters of capabilities (for 
instance, across different geographies) while temporarily ignoring firms.  In principle, 
this might be a reasonable analytical strategy; it is well known that most firms recruit 
to fill contracts from databases on individuals, and that these individuals typically 
appear on the databases of more than one firm (Singer, 2003).  Therefore, what 
might be important is the availability of these individuals and their capabilities to 
groups of firms, rather than what individual firms do.  In other words, firms might 
merely be “shells” that hide underlying capability sets that are important at the 
national and regional level, rather than at the firm level. 
Second, the overall similarity of the industry across geographic regions points 
somewhat to the international nature of the business.  While there is significant 
variation in the specific offerings of individual firms, in general about 50% of firms 
offer protective services; this is true globally—regardless of a firm’s national origins.  
The geographic proportions hold steady for training/advisory services and support 
services. 
I. Reprise: Defining and Bounding the PM Sector 
An analysis of PMF capabilities invariably leads us back to the question of 
what (and who) belongs inside the sector (Oritz, 2007b).  In conducting our survey, 
we initially used a generous definition of firms active within the PM sector in some 
form or another.  But clearly, the definition of “sector” and “participant” is important 
here.  Figure 16 summarizes the various ways we think the sector might be defined:   
 
 - 26 - 
 
Figure 16. Defining the PM Sector 
In this diagram, the vertical axis explains what activity is taking place.  The 
activities are arrayed according to Singer’s “tip of the spear” heuristic.  The 
horizontal axis illustrates where activities are occurring—either in hot zones (how hot 
of course varies) or at home (i.e., some other safe location).  
The most restrictive definition of the “industry” would focus on Segments 1 
and 2 in this figure.  The 2006 IPOA survey used this restrictive definition of the 
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sample of 100 firms.  In its report on PMFs, Human Rights First (2008, p. 1) used a 
similar definition, explaining that: 
There is no universal, agreed definition of the term “private security 
contractor” […] Human Rights First uses here an essentially functional 
definition of the term in light of the actual activities of such contractors fielded 
in Iraq and Afghanistan with a basic security mission—that is, a core mission 
to protect people (other than themselves) or things, to include guarding 
government (and contractors) facilities, protecting government personnel (and 
other government contractors) and United Nations (U.N.) and other 
international organization staff as well, and providing security for convoys. 
However, in its 2007 follow-on report, the IPOA broadened its survey to 
include an identified sample of 334 firms.  While we can’t be completely sure of the 
Institute’s criteria for inclusion in its sample, we suspect that it reflects Segments 1 
and 2 in the diagram above, plus Segments 3 and 4, and possibly some firms in 
Segment 5.   
The two problem zones (or “gray areas”) in analyzing the PM sector are 
Segments 5 and 6.  Some elements of Sector 5 fall more easily inside the 
parameters we believe most analysts would agree define the PM sector.  For 
instance, Blackwater’s North Carolina training range, which includes various 
weapons ranges, is sometimes touted as the best in the world for some types of 
military training.  Many aspects of MPRI’s advisement activities would also clearly 
fall in this segment.  However, where should we classify activities such as Cubic’s 
virtual training systems?  Should we include firms such as Cubic in the PM sector, or 
exclude it?  We think there are arguments on both sides. 
Even more problematic is Segment 6 in the diagram.  There are two issues 
here.  First, we often cannot tell where the activities of support firms take place 
based on third party reports about the industry or declarations by the firms 
themselves.   Second, there is the question of whether the activities themselves 
belong inside the industry.  IS/IT/communications firms are particularly troublesome 
in this regard.  Let’s examine, for example, CACI.  It is a major provider of support 
services to the DoD and for the intelligence communities.  Or, we could study 
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Mantech.  It builds and maintains databases that track potential terrorists and 
provides a range of other IT-related support services to the intelligence communities.  
If these services are largely performed at home, should we define them as inside the 
PM sector?  And what about the services themselves—the things these firms do 
certainly appear to be a very different kind of business than DynCorp and 
ArmorGroup.  They are involved in non-traditional types of “warfare.”  However, 
according to some arguments, if these types of activities reflect the way conflict is 
evolving into the future, firms like CACI and Mantech are—arguably—critical 
precursors of a new wave of private defense-sector firms.  Should they be included 
in our sample of the PM sector, or left out?    
It is important to note that in reporting on PM-sector demographics, we used 
an expansive definition of the industry: we included all the segments above.  In part, 
this is because our aim was to capture a comprehensive list of firms and activities. 
The purpose of our report is to inform the DoD acquisition community about the 
range of firms active in the industry, rather than to identify firms that are central 
industry participants.  Hence, we developed a list of 550 firms that have participated 
in the industry.  We believe this doesn’t bias our analysis in any particular way; 
however, we feel readers should be aware of our sampling technique. 
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5. Publicly Listed Firms Active in the PM Sector 
A. Publicly Listed Firms with PM-sector Interests 
In this section of the paper, we’ll discuss publicly listed firms that are active in 
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When we examined public firms in the sector, we began by asking, “In which 
firms would we invest if we wanted to create an investment portfolio that was 
significantly exposed to the PM sector?”  For the purposes of this report, we sorted 
through an initial list of 25 candidate firms.  We had two main criteria for eliminating 
firms: 
 First, we eliminated those that were not significantly exposed to the 
sector.  For instance, Lockheed Martin has been aggressively 
expanding in the service side of defense by recently acquiring PAE 
(Pacific Architects and Engineers, a KBR competitor in base 
operations, as well as provider of other services to the State 
Department) and Sytex (an IS/IT support firm that establishes remote 
surveillance bases for the Air Force, for instance).  It also is a joint-
venture partner in a major maintenance service supplier, DS2 
(Defense Support Services).  However, Lockheed’s PM-related 
businesses are a small part of its overall revenues.  For instance, 
Sytex and PAE together probably account for only 2% of LM’s 
revenues.  By comparison, KBR generates well over half its revenues 
in the PM sector. Therefore, we excluded firms like Lockheed because 
its financial data are poor indicators of its involvement in the PM 
sector.  By the same rationale, we eliminated firms such as AECOM 
(whose AGS division runs Camp Doha in Kuwait) and L-3 
Communications (with its well-known MPRI division). 
 Second, we eliminated firms that—as far as we know—are mainly 
active in Segments 5 and 6 of Figure 16; i.e., their services are 
predominantly undertaken at home in training and advisory and 
support activities.  This led us to eliminate an important group of 
publicly listed IS/IT/communications providers to the defense and 
intelligence communities, such as SAIC, CACI and Mantech.  It also 
led us to eliminate firms such as Cubic (which provides training 
services), DeticaDFI (a boutique consultancy that counts the Joint 
Chiefs and the OSD among its clients), and URS, whose E.G. & G. 
Services division supports DoD weapon systems and training needs. 
This left us with a small group of firms that are the “pure plays” of the PM 
sector.  Their names will not come as any surprise to people familiar with the sector: 
1. DynCorp—sometimes described as the world’s premier “police for hire” 
firm. It is a major contractor to the State department for close-
protection services and police training in Iraq. 
2. ArmourGroup—formerly DSL, was IPO’d in 2004 on the London Stock 
Exchange.  It is a DynCorp competitor for many training and close-
protection contracts. 
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3. KBR—was IPO’d in 2006 after many years as a division of Halliburton.  
It is one of the DoD’s main support contractors for logistics, base 
operations and administration in Iraq and elsewhere.  More than half its 
revenues are derived from its LOGCAP contracts alone. 
Figure 18 shows one measure of size and activity in the sector: 2006 















Figure 18. PM Sector Revenues  
(2006; $ million) 
Next we analyze these firms to see what we might be able to learn about 
trends in the PM sector.  
B. Growth of the PM Sector 
There is conflicting data about the size and growth of the PM sector in recent 
years.  Here, we display data on the compound annual growth in revenues for our 
three firms.  If we assume these firms are typical, then this represents one way of 
generating a data-driven perspective on the growth of the sector. 


















Figure 19. Revenue Growth Year-on-year  
(%) 
Figure 19 illustrates the dramatic growth in revenues during the 2002-2004 
period.  Even these enormous expansions of activity may understate the actual 
expansion going on in the industry. For instance, ArmorGroup, in its 2004 annual 
report, suggested that industry revenues doubled between 2003 and 2004. 
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Figure 20. Net Profit Margin  
(%) 
As illustrated in Figure 10, one concern that observers—even seemingly 
sympathetic ones such as Singer (2003)—invariably raise about PMFs is their 
profitability.  There is a strong suspicion that PMFs engage in war profiteering.  
Based on the data we collected from SEC filings and the audited annual reports of 
firms, we believe claims of profiteering are hard to justify.  The average net profit 
margin of KBR, DynCorp and ArmorGroup (2002-2007) was just 1.3% (calculated as 
net income after tax divided by revenues).  This number is low by most comparisons.  
For instance, in 2006, these firms averaged 1.6%.  In the same year, 15 defense 
and aerospace firms appeared in the Fortune 500: their average net profit on sales 
was 5.2% (this data includes the prime US defense contractors).  The Fortune 100 
averaged 7.4% in 2006 (Fortune, 2007). 
D. EVA (Economic Value Added) 
To further examine the issue of profitability, we analyzed DynCorp, KBR and 
ArmorGroup using a popular measure of value creation: EVA (economic value 
added).  The basic idea of EVA is that it allows you to calculate the “true” economic 
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profit of a firm.  In principle, EVA measures how much value a firm creates over and 
above its opportunity cost of capital invested.  The idea is that firms must cover both 
their operating costs and their capital costs in order to create any real value.  The 
basic calculation for EVA is as follows: 
Revenues 
less   Operating Expenses  
less   Taxes  
less   Capital Charges (Invested Capital x Cost of Capital) 
=    EVA 
The results of our EVA calculations are displayed in Table 3 (below).  The 
table shows that the break-even cost of capital (that generates an EVA of zero) for 
the three firms is 6.6%.  Again, this is low.  What it means is that if the actual cost of 
capital for our three firms were anything higher than 6.6%, they would be value 
destroyers, not value creators.  It seems likely that the applicable costs of capital 
would be higher than 6.6%; this is a low cost of capital even for highly reliable 
industrial sectors, let alone PMFs.  
Note: Readers are reminded that EVA, like all economic indicators, is 
sensitive to assumptions.  The tricky number to calculate is Invested Capital 
because several different methodologies exist for this calculation.  Except for 
invested capital for KBR, the data in Table 3 can be derived fairly straightforwardly 
from publicly available sources.  We assumed 50% of KBR’s invested capital is 
attributable to its Government and Infrastructure division (KBR, 2006, p. 105).  This 
assumption is conservative in the sense that it probably makes KBR’s EVA look 
better than it really is.  More aggressive assumptions would increase KBR’s break-
even cost of capital.  
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Table 3. EVA (Economic Value Added) 
Operating income pre-tax and financing 2004 2005 2006 Average
ARG 17 12 11  
DCP 102 101 114  
KBR 82 332 201  
     
Income tax rate     
ARG 31% 30% 26%  
DCP 38% 41% 43%  
KBR 15% 47% 32%  
     
Total assets     
ARG 87 119 127  
DCP 1148 1239 1363  
KBR 2744 2591 2704  
     
Accounts payable and other current liabilities     
ARG 16 17 21  
DCP 224 243 332  
KBR 749 770 729  
     
NOPAT (net operating profit after tax) (CALC)     
ARG 12 9 8  
DCP 63 60 64  
KBR 70 175 137  
     
Invested capital (Total assets—AP and OCL) 
(CALC)     
ARG 71 102 106  
DCP 924 996 1031  
KBR 1994 1821 1975  
     
Capital charge    6.6% 
     
Capital charges (Invested capital x capital charge)     
ARG -5 -7 -7  
DCP -61 -66 -68  
KBR -132 -121 -131  
     
EVA (CALC)     
ARG 7 2 1 10 
DCP 2 -6 -4 -8 
KBR -62 55 6 -1 
     
3 Firms’ Average EVA    0 
 - 37 - 
E. Understanding the Data: Some Thoughts 
When we think about firms in the PM sector, our implicit assumptions can 
easily mislead us into thinking that firms are likely to be highly profitable.  After all, in 
many locations the work is risky, and the reward for risk is profit, right?  Yet, the 
performance of the publicly listed firms analyzed here indicates that perhaps the 
sector is not as profitable as we might expect.  Why not? 
To understand why it may be that our “pure plays” in the PM sector have low 
margins and negative EVA, we need to make two analytical moves.  First, we need 
to analyze firms not as entities; instead, we need to decompose firms into 
stakeholders.  Second, we need to analyze firm profitability as the result of a two-
stage game in which the first stage involves how firms manage to generate 
organizational rents; the second stage examines how much of that rent is 
appropriated by inside stakeholders—i.e., employees (Coff, 1999).  For an 
illustration of this argument, see Figure 21 below. 
 
Figure 21. Profit Observed in Firm Performance 
The first stage of the game is generating rents from contract awards.  Here, 
we can mislead ourselves by making the erroneous assumption that just because 
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contracts appears to be very high.  In its 2007 Interim report, ArmorGroup remarked 
on competitive conditions in the sector, saying that many of its competitors were 
willing to bid for contracts at prices that, it felt, left no margin for making a profit.  It 
appears that buyers have substantial bargaining power relative to suppliers: they are 
large and concentrated; they award contracts typically in large chunks; and they 
have a large amount of information about supplier costs (some of which is generated 
by contract mechanisms that encourage cost transparency, such as cost-plus 
contracts).  
The second stage of the game is rent appropriation.  Stakeholders compete 
directly for the rents organizations manage to generate.  Outside stakeholders are 
stockholders and suppliers.  Inside stakeholders are employees and management.  
Profits accrue to stockholders, but even highly competitive organizations are not 
necessarily profitable: everything depends on how much of the rent generated by an 
organization is appropriated by inside stakeholders, such as employees and 
management.  Therefore, even when firms manage to secure contracts at favorable 
rates, these contracts don’t necessarily yield profits.  According to Coff (1999), 
employees’ ability to appropriate rent depends on three factors that drive employee 
bargaining power: the scarcity of their skills, their access to information, and their 
ability to organize collectively.  Particularly in the PM sector, firms depend heavily on 
the human capital of their employees. In addition, information about “going rates” for 
contractors is widely available—in part because firms typically fill contracts the same 
way that temp agencies fill them (using a database of individuals).  If we observed 
these factors alone, it would be reasonable for us to assume that employees have 
strong bargaining power compared to PMFs.   
However, in the PM sector, we must add another factor to the mix: risk.  Who 
bears the risk of doing business in the sector?  While clearly stockholders bear some 
financial risks, the employees who fill the contracts clearly bear enormous personal 
safety risk.  Data on contractor deaths in Iraq alone confirms this.  Therefore, the 
sharing of risk-bearing in the PM sector follows a somewhat different pattern than 
typical commercial ventures.  Unsurprisingly, this means that much of the rent 
 - 39 - 
generated by firms is probably being appropriated by individual employees, leaving 
slim profit margins for the firms themselves. 
6. Discussion 
A. Thinking about the PM Sector: Some Building Blocks 
What we predict about the future depends to some degree on how we think 
about the past and how we conceptualize the present.  For a summary of this point, 
see Figure 22 below. 
 
Figure 22. Past, Present, Future 
In what follows, we will split our analysis into two parts for simplicity: 
1. Understanding the evolution of demand-side factors in the PM sector, 
and 
2. Understanding the evolution of supply-side factors in the PM sector. 
These are stories that have been told before—there are already widely held 
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its development (see several essays in Jager & Kummel, 2007, for   example).  
Here, we are going to tell the story somewhat differently. 
B. Demand-side Story 
Our starting point for the demand-side story is that a richer, more complex, 
set of factors are at work than has been generally recognized.  In particular, our 
conjecture is that the short-term contingencies that have generally caught analysts’ 
attention mask a set of longer-term trends that have been at work in shaping the 
sector and that—we think—are going to continue to affect the evolution of demand-
side factors for the foreseeable future.  Importantly, these trends have emerged not 
from the defense/government sector but from the private and non-government 
sectors.  
First, for evidence on the importance of multi-sector demand for PM services, 
consider the following data (Figure 23) collected in a survey of the industry by the 
IPOA (2007).   
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Figure 23. Reproduction of IPOA Report  
(2007, p. 21, Chart 5.1)  
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PMFs invariably deal with private-sector customers as well as government 
ones, with international organizations, NGOs (non-governmental organizations), and 
some private individuals.  Absent Iraq, the biggest part of their business would 
probably be with the private sector (for example, protecting assets in mineral 
extraction industries, such as BP oil’s facilities in Colombia and Algeria).  In other 
words, before Iraq, most PMFs were probably doing more of their business with the 
private sector, not the public sector.  This gives us important clues about long-term 
sources of demand for PM services.  
Starting with this analysis of the organizational sources of demand, we traced 
back these elements to their sources.  The picture that emerges attenuates some of 
our existing notions about the sources of demand for PM services, broadly 
conceived.  For a summary of our analysis, see Figure 24 below.  We highlight the 
following elements of the figure in more detail, as follows: 
 Permanently “failing” states.  As highlighted by Collier’s recent book 
“The Bottom Billion” (Collier, 2007), there is a cadre of approximately 
60 nations in the world in which approximately a billion people live 
mostly in extreme poverty.  These countries include states that the 
World Bank classifies as “fragile.”  Collier—a noted scholar—terms 
them as “Africa +.”  While the majority of these countries are in Africa, 
the set also includes countries such as Laos and Cambodia, Burma 
and North Korea, and several central Asian countries.  These states 
have both low GDP (gross national product) and little, no, or negative 
GDP growth over the past 25 years.  Collier says they are caught in 
one (or more) of four “traps”: conflict/civil war, natural resource 
dependencies, poor government, or being landlocked with bad 
neighbors. 
 Rising wealth.  Giving is on the rise (Clinton, 2007).  In fact, the world 
has probably never seen as much altruism as exists in today’s 
societies—an effect we trace to rising wealth in the developed western 
economies.  Moreover, the giving business is well organized in terms 
of getting money from donors, political lobbying of other organizations 
and governments, and management of the distribution of resources to 
projects and recipients.  Private giving is being channeled heavily into 
projects to help solve the problems of the bottom billion of humankind 
(e.g., medical and famine relief in Africa).  
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 Natural resource dependencies.  Natural resource extraction industries 
are frequent employers of PMFs (Drohan, 2004).  There is a reason for 
this.  Politically attractive areas have had their natural resource 
deposits extensively searched in the past century.  Having exhausted 
these areas, big firms in the extractive industries are increasingly 
finding that they now have to venture into less hospitable political 
climates in order to find big natural resource deposits that are efficient 
to extract—the so-called “elephant” resources: for example, giant oil 
fields in Chad (Tertzakian, 2007). 
 Normative policy paradigms.  Both the private sector and government 
sector have been significantly shaped by changes in policy paradigms 
ushered in by Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980s (Hall, 1993).  The 
privatization movement of the past 25 years has led to considerable 
decentralization of activities once organized in government 
bureaucracies, including military and security-related activities (Oritz, 
2007b, p. 56). 
If one traces these four elements forward (as in Figure 24), they lead to a 
boom in demand for private security services, often in the “failing states.”  Why in 
these areas?  Because these are precisely the places where governments cannot (in 
any realistic sense) guarantee the security of individuals; hence, individuals have to 
make their own security arrangements.  NGOs, international organizations, 
extractive industries and some western government agencies are driven to do work 
in these countries for a variety of reasons and, when they get there, they have to at 
least supplement local security arrangements in order to bring security up to 
standards their employees find acceptable (Avant, 2007).  If not, these organizations 
cannot carry out their work in these places.   
Moreover, we expect that these demand-side trends will continue.  Collier’s 
(2007) major point about the bottom billion is that these countries are not just in 
trouble—they are trapped; i.e., they have little hope of pulling themselves up by their 
own bootstraps.  If this is indeed the case, we expect demand for PM services in 
these places will persist and grow—that is, if the western world pours more 
resources into attempts to “fix” these countries.  
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Figure 24. Evolution of Demand-side Factors at Work in the PM Sector 
C. The Supply-side Story: Different Pieces Evolving 
Differently for Different Reasons 
Based on our earlier analysis of the “tip of the spear” typology, we feel the PM 
sector is by no means unitary—in fact, it is made up of quite different elements.  
These elements have very different evolutionary trajectories.  Seeing them together 
is nothing more than seeing a contingent cluster of activities that happens to be aptly 
described as the “PM sector” at this particular point in time.  In fact, these different 
pieces of the sector have different drivers that have caused them to emerge as we 
see them today. For example: 
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 Logistics outsourcing.  The underlying drivers for logistics outsourcing 
(e.g., KBR Logcap) are gains from trade/economic efficiency; i.e., local 
civilian labor is substituted for US military labor. 
 Operation and maintenance support for tactical equipment.  The 
drivers for outsourcing operation and maintenance support for tactical 
equipment (e.g., DS2’s contracts for keeping Bradley fighting vehicles 
and Apache helicopters moving) is technical complexity, which 
necessitates highly trained/specialized labor services needed to 
support the operation of these platforms in the field.  The evolution of 
this sector is driven by the continual “up-skilling” of technicians and 
investments in co-specialized support equipment needed to do the 
work. 
 EOD/de-mining.  The evolution of this sub-sector has a different 
dynamic.  In his thesis work, NPS student Ercan Donmez (2007) 
traced the complex evolution of this field—which has been driven by a 
variety of public pressures, interest group activity and inter-
organizational collaborations.  Since the late 1980s, a paradigm has 
emerged under which de-mining activity generally takes place around 
the world, and its drivers are far different from drivers of evolution in, 
for example, the support of tactical equipment or logistics outsourcing. 
 Other sub-sectors.  Of course, we could extend this analysis further by 
examining the evolution of the following additional elements of the PM 
sector highlighted in our earlier analysis of the “tip of the spear”:  
• Training 
• Advisory 
• Engineering and construction 
• IT/IS security services 
• Intelligence services: surveillance, information gathering, 
investigations 
• Base operations 
• Medical 
• Etc. 
If we examined each of these sub-sectors in turn, we would find that each 
individual segment of the PM sector has its own evolutionary dynamics.  Each can 
be thought of as having a paradigmatic character, and the particular factors driving 
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the pace and style of evolution in these sub-sectors tend to have their own unique 
attributes that make each one different from the evolution of other sub-sectors of PM 
activity. For instance, the rapid pace of recent changes in technology has probably 
had quite a different effect on surveillance and information gathering than it has had 
on advisory activities. 
1. A (Very) Brief Detour into Paradigms 
Fundamentally, our remarks in this part of the report are based on the 
concept of “paradigms” originally described in Thomas Kuhn’s work on the evolution 
of science (Kuhn, 1962).  Since then, Kuhn’s work has been extended so many 
different directions that it would be impossible to recount them all.  For our purposes, 
what is important is to realize that the concept of paradigms has heavily influenced 
thinking about how industries evolve.  There is a large body of academic work on 
this topic (key among which are Dosi (1982) and Mokyr (1990); see also Geroski 
(2003) for a very accessible account).  The basic argument in this literature is that 
industries evolve in ways that are remarkable—similar to how Kuhn described the 
evolution of scientific research programs.  This theory can be summarized as 
follows:  
1. What is a paradigm? It can be thought of as an evolving artifact that is 
being developed and improved, such as a scientific discipline 
(physics), a technology, a product or service (integrated circuits, 
automobiles, package delivery), or a field of activity or practice (such 
as an industry, or military specialization such as undersea warfare).   
2. Fundamentally, paradigms tell people how to think about the artifact in 
question: they are the “lens” or “frame” or “recipe” that is used in the 
activity.  Therefore, paradigms define how people approach normal 
problem-solving activity in an industry. This has sometimes been 
referred to as the notion of “industry recipes” (Spender, 1989).  They 
define the know-how, equipment, procedures and experience which 
are accumulated in an industry.  They define the heuristics that people 
use (e.g., Where do we go from here? Where should we search? What 
sort of knowledge should we draw on?) to effect changes on the 
evolving artifact.  Therefore, individuals working within a paradigm 
inhabit a particular “worldview” (Kuhn, 1962).  
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3. One of the key ideas Kuhn’s text highlights is that, once established, 
paradigms have a “life of their own”; i.e.; they display a momentum of 
their own that is built upon the accumulated inputs of multiple actors. 
This is captured in the idea of trajectories, i.e., that industries evolve 
along particular trajectories by accumulating various adaptations over 
time. This is because paradigmatic worldviews are not just shared 
practices; they are also often embedded in the structure and 
organization of firms and whole industrial sectors (Freeman & Perez, 
1988).  Figure 25 below illustrates the notion of a trajectory of 
development of an industry (Geroski, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 25. The Evolutionary Trajectory of an Industry 
D. So What about the PM Protection Business?  What 
Paradigm Is It Following?  
Conventional wisdom on the PM sector traces the origins of the sector to the 
mercenary companies of the early modern period (Oritz, 2007a; Singer, 2003).  
Indeed, one modern PMF probably justifies this history lesson: Executive Outcomes 
(EO).  The problem with this history lesson is that EOs (as well as being defunct, a 
blip of the historical radar screen) and firms like it are a vanishingly small element of 
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activities performed at the “pointy end” of the spear.  Our conclusion is that they are 
not at all typical; i.e., whatever the protection sub-sector is, in general, it isn’t what 
EOs typify. 
Why does this matter?  One way we make sense of the unfamiliar is by 
drawing on things that we know and seeing the unfamiliar in terms of partial 
likenesses to these more familiar artifacts.  One thing serves as a mental model for 
another, and we understand, comprehend and make sense of the less familiar by 
way of analogies and metaphors from our mental model.  To do this, we draw on 
certain attributes or entailments of the model and project them onto our target: the 
less familiar thing (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
In general, analogy works well in aiding comprehension.  However, analogies 
are always partial and can sometimes lead us astray.  If enough facts don’t fit, we 
eventually have to find different models and decide if they are more useful in helping 
us understand our target phenomenon. 
We think this is perhaps true for the protective services element of the PM 
sector.  Here, the historical analogy between mercenary companies and Executive 
Outcomes fits well; but if the EO doesn’t look like most of the protective services 
firms in our study, then neither does the mercenary company analogy fit well with 
most of the firms engaged in protective services in our study.  Also, if we assume 
that most industries evolve (often fairly incrementally) out of previous ones, it’s hard 
to make a strong case for an evolutionary process that underpins the development, 
growth and trajectory of the PM industry using (by now ancient) mercenary 
companies as a starting point.  Thus, the more and more we examined the issue of 
“where did the protective services business come from?”, the more the EO began to 
appear as an outlier in a larger evolutionary process that has not adequately been 
traced and understood.   
This left us searching for a potentially more useful historical model—
assuming there is one—that might help us better understand this sub-sector of the 
PM business.  We began to search for clues that might generate a different 
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perspective on the paradigmatic origins of the private protective-services business.  
Some of the elements that have shaped our thinking have been the following: 
 First, the structure of demand for PM services has historically been 
driven by several non-defense sources, as well as by the more widely 
recognized defense-related sources. 
 Second, the major and most visible contracts between the public 
sector and protection firms came from the US State Department, not 
the DoD.  Thus, the firms being employed on these contracts are not, 
in general, augmenting or substituting military manpower.  Instead, 
they are augmenting and substituting security activities in other 
government departments; they are people whose job it is to secure 
various assets. 
 Third, fundamentally the kinds of contracts and their parties ought to 
alert us to something: it is security and protection that is being 
outsourced, not the ability to project force.  
 Fourth, when we study the kind of firms involved in protection services, 
we quickly find that it is very difficult to draw the line between unarmed 
and armed protection and very difficult to draw a clear line between the 
types of firms active in this sub-sector.  For instance, Group 4 
Securicor (G4S) has a large “special services” business that sells 
bodyguard services.  The firm also conducts special security services 
for airports and public events.  However, in G4S’s case, these services 
are bundled in with a portfolio of more mundane commercial security 
services, so G4S is not (in general) seen as a central player in the PM 
sector. Instead, it is seen more as a private security firm.  In essence, 
G4S is a case of “sideways” entry into the protective services 
business.  Looking at the kind of US firms offering protective services, 
many of these are sideways entries from other industries (for example, 
consider firms like Zapata Engineering and AGS).   
This logic led us to the conjecture that it might be productive to investigate 
protective services as an evolutionary outgrowth of a private security industry 
paradigm; i.e., maybe protection services in Iraq and other hostile environments 
have been co-opted from everyday activities in the private sector and might, 
therefore, be thought of as outgrowths of protection services that are offered 
generically in the western world.  This impression was reinforced when we examined 
the origins, evolution, growth and complexity of the worldwide private security 
industry (Kinsey, 2007).  Figure 26 provides a figurative interpretation of the sector’s 
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evolutionary trajectory. (Note: this diagram is purely figurative, not data-driven, and 
is designed to be illustrative of our idea only.) 
If, for a moment, we entertain this hypothesis, then we begin to see that the 
current protective services business (particularly the US-based firms, which account 
for half the industry) might be thought of as having deep roots in the domestic US 
security scene.  To see this more clearly, we need to remember that the provision of 
security has been a joint public-private endeavor in the US since the country’s 
founding (see Churchill (2004) for a historical review).  Private protection of property 
and person has never been suppressed in the US to the extent that it was in many 
nations during the Twentieth Century. In other words, the US government has never 
completely monopolized the control of security, either domestically or internationally. 
(If anyone is in any doubt about this, he/she can consider the 5,000 Vinnell 
employees working on security-related tasks in Vietnam, or—domestically—the 
tradition of private detective agencies and bounty hunters chasing bail-jumpers.)  
Moreover, periods in which private security has been less utilized might be more a 
function of demand for services than supply; i.e., low levels of market activity mask 
the availability of various types of security services in the US, many of which are 
latent and available via the kind of sideways entry we have already discussed.  In 
other words, an ephemeral market for protective services (latent and potential) has 
long existed in the US, but has sometimes been invisible because of demand 
conditions.  By this reasoning, the current protective services market has always 
been there; it just has never before been co-opted by government agencies to work 
outside the US to the extent it is today in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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Figure 26. The Private Protection Business as Part of the Evolution and 
Growth of the Private Security Sector 
By this reasoning, if we search for a firm that epitomizes the pointy end of the 
private military sector spear, we would perhaps see a firm such as the Pinkerton 
detective agency as a more appropriate model than the EO (Churchill, 2004).  
Consider the following parallels, for example.  Blackwater—probably the highest 
profile PMF in the world—successfully handled Paul Brenner’s security in Iraq.  In its 
heyday, Pinkerton successfully handled Abraham Lincoln’s personal security during 
the Civil War (though it was not responsible for his security, interestingly enough, 
when he has assassinated).  Blackwater has performed a wide range of security 
guarding and private military contracting work both for branches of the US 
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Pinkerton performed exactly the same kind of services in its day for the Department 
of Justice (which hired the agency when it was founded) and the big business 
interests of its time (in particular, the railroads, which employed Pinkerton 
employees as railroad police).  In 1892, while Pinkerton was employed by Carnegie 
in Pennsylvania, the New York Times remarked that, “The Pinkerton invasion of 
Pennsylvania looked like the work of a mercenary army” (cited in Churchill, 2004, p. 
f121).  In 2005, as Blackwater employees wandered the waterlogged streets of post-
Katrina New Orleans wearing various degrees of combat gear and touting M16s, 
they perhaps looked like a mercenary army.   
Per our previous comments, such historical analogies are (by their nature) 
imprecise and may be misleading.  Our point here is that it is not hard to trace an 
evolutionary lineage from Pinkerton to the protective security activities of 
contemporary PMFs such as Blackwater.  Importantly, Pinkerton—despite at one 
point employing more agents than the US standing army—was always essentially a 
firm engaged in security-related services, up to and including pursuing the “bad 
guys” (in their day, Jesse James).  They were not, in essence, mercenaries. 
By this interpretation, the link between the protective services segment of the 
PM sector and state militaries seems rather tenuous and might need to be re-
thought.  Mercenaries, after all, are substitutes for state militaries.  But if private 
security firms are not best thought of as mercenaries, then this substitution—or this 
threat of substitution—does not hold.  If so, at least some of the widespread anxiety 
of political scientists about the PM sector might be unjustified.   
For a variety of reasons, we believe that the people who run PMFs may have 
a mental model of the sector that looks more like Pinkerton’s than a firm like 
Exective Outcomes.  Perhaps their perspective is different; they fundamentally see 
the sector differently than how external analysts have often sought to portray it.  If 
so, then how they perceive the activities of their own organizations may be very 
much at odds with how outsiders perceive these activities.  This is to say, the inside 
view of the fundamental “recipe” of the sector is different (Spender, 1989)—in terms 
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of insiders’ consensus about how business might be done, what customers really 
want, how firms (and individuals) can make money in the sector, and what the future 
holds.   
If this is the case, we are reminded of Charles Fishman’s bestselling book on 
Wal*Mart (Fishman, 2006); he argues that Wal*Mart’s problems (in large part) stem 
from the fact that the firm is built around a particular culture.  This culture constrains 
how Wal*Mart insiders see the firm.  The consequence is that Wal*Mart managers 
just cannot see that the rest of the world perceives it differently.  The inside view and 
the outside view are rather different.  The result of these incommensurate 
perspectives is that insiders and outsiders are always slightly at cross purposes 
(Kuhn, 1962). 
Clearly, to properly substantiate the model of the protective services business 
we have suggested here, we need to thoroughly understand the evolution of the 
private security industry—something we have not undertaken within thus study.  
However, we believe there is enough evidence (for instance, the diversification of 
commercial security firms into the PM sector) and enough theory (for instance, 
institutional theory about how new fields are created out of old ones, how legitimacy 
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